

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD509173	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	unclassified
FROM:	confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO:	Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM:	Controlling DoD Oorganization. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, D 20310.
AUTHORITY	
AGO D/A ltr, 16 Jul 1976; AGO D/A ltr, 16 Jul 1976	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



IN REPLY REFER TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

UNCLASSIFIED

AGDA (M) (13 May 70) FOR OT UT 701298 21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Brigade,  
9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

AD 509173

SEE DISTRIBUTION

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION OF THE NATIONAL  
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C. SECTION 793 AND 794,  
ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO AN  
ANY MANNER OF INFORMATION IS PROHIBITED BY LAW."

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.


BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*  
KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding Generals
  - US Continental Army Command
  - US Army Combat Developments Command
  - US Army Materiel Command
- Commandants
  - US Army War College
  - US Army Command and General Staff College
  - US Army Armor School
  - US Army Aviation School
  - US Army Chemical School
  - US Army Civil Affairs School
  - US Army Combat Surveillance School
  - US Army Electronic Warfare School
  - US Army Engineer School
  - US Army Field Artillery School
  - US Army Infantry School



Regraded unclassified when separated  
from classified inclosure.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2005 0322 362

UNCLASSIFIED

# PAGE 2 DISTRIBUTION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96371

1. SUMMARY

1. FEB 1970

Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (1)

Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, ATTN: AVDC-WH, APO 96225  
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-EST, APO 96275  
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GFCP-DT, APO 96550

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Introduction:

(1) During the reporting period, 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued operations in Long An Province and the border areas of the four adjacent provinces; Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh, Dinh Tuong and Kien Tuong. The brigade headquarters remained at Tan An.

(2) The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was involved in combat operations every day (92) of this reporting period. There were two (2) twenty-four (24) hour cease fires during this reporting period; 241800H-251800H December 1969 and 311800H December 1969 - 011800H January 1970. Only base defense operations were conducted during these two periods.

(3) During this reporting period, the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division participated in Operation Toan Thang (Phase IV). The objective of Operation Toan Thang IV (Complete Victory) is to seek out the enemy with combined operations to prevent his employment of men and equipment.

b. (C) Organization:

(1) The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was organized as a Separate Light Infantry Brigade on 20 July 1969. Under the provisions of USARPV 2434, dated 6 July 1969, effective 20 July 1969, the following units were assigned to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division:

FOR CT CT

101275

Inclosure

1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

Best Available Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>ACC</u>
HMC, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division	40	8	155	203
2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mechanized)	40	2	865	907
6th Battalion, 31st Infantry	43	2	875	920
2d Battalion, 60th Infantry	43	2	875	920
5th Battalion, 60th Infantry	43	2	875	920
2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery	52	3	586	641
39th Chemical Detachment	1		1	5
19th Public Information Detachment	2		3	5
19th Military History Detachment	1		1	2
264th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)		1	7	8
45th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)	1		27	28
United States Army Air Cushion Vehicle Platoon	2		33	35

(2) Additionally, the following units were provisionally organized and assigned to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division under the provisions of USARV GO 2434, dated 6 July 1969, effective 20 July 1969:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ANC</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>ACC</u>
Composite Service Support Battalion (Prov)	41	1	9	190	541
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (Prov)	12		1	53	66
Company A (Prov)	12		3	177	192
Company B (Prov)	9		5	184	198
Company C (Prov)	8	1		76	85

Inclosure

2

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVSR-MF

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Engineer Company (Prov)	5	160	165
Signal Company (Prov)	3	99	102
Military Police Platoon (Prov)	1	39	40
MPQ-4 Radar Detachment (Prov)		1	8 9
Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker) (Prov)		10	10
Company, Infantry (Ranger) (Prov)	2	59	61
Military Intelligence Detachment (Prov)	9	2	21 32

(3) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, provisionally reorganized during the period 20 July 1969 to 1 October 1969 under the provisions of USARV CO 2434, dated 6 July 1969, was reorganized under the provisions of USARPAC CO 705, dated 24 September 1969, effective 1 October 1969. The unit was organized under MTOE 77-102T PAC 2/68. Strength authorization remained the same.

(4) Due to the aircraft configuration (four LOH's and four UH-1H's) a sixteen man augmentation to the Brigade Aviation Section is authorized under MTOE 77-102T.

(5) On 20 July 1969, operational control of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was given to the Commanding General, II FFORCEV, who in turn placed the 3d Brigade under the operational control of the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division.

(6) Effective 1 October 1969, USARPAC CO 705, dated 24 September 1969, granted authority to activate and organize the following units with manning strengths as indicated:

UNIT	OFF	WO	ENL	ACC
56th Signal Company	3		99	102
571st Engineer Company	5		160	165
99th CS Support Battalion	42	9	193	544
483d Military Police Platoon	1		39	40

Inclosure

3

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVHB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

65th Infantry Detachment (Combat Tracker)		10	10
Company E, 75th Infantry (Ranger)	2	50	61
493d Military Intelligence Detachment	9	2	21 32
276th Artillery Detachment (Radar)	1	8	9

(7) Effective 1 October 1969, USARV CO 4437, dated 15 December 1969, further assigned units (reference paragraph (6) above) from USARV to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, with no change to authorized manning strengths

(8) Organization Structure - Inclosure 1

(9) Task Organization and Unit Locations - Inclosure 2

(10) Roster of Key Personnel - Inclosure 3

(11) Brigade TAOI - Inclosure 4

c. (C) Personnel and Administration

(1) Maintenance of Unit Strength During this reporting period the 3d Brigade experienced a general reduction in enlisted strength as a result of the effort to reach the authorized strength level. Although more replacements were received during this period, the brigade experienced much greater losses, thus permitting the reduction in strength. During the period many of the remaining personnel from the 9th Infantry Division who had elected to remain in Vietnam completed their tours and returned to CONUS, thereby contributing to the lowering of unit strength. In contrast to the general reduction in enlisted strength, officer and warrant officer strengths showed a slight increase. Commissioned officer strength averaged about 105% while warrant officer strength averaged about 102% for the period. Casualty figures for this period were slightly lower than last period. Inclosures 5 and 6 depict Brigade Strength, Replacements, Rotations and Casualties for the reporting period.

(2) Personnel and Manpower Management.

(a) Reenlistment: 1. During the last month of the reporting period there was a decline in the number of first term reenlistments. This can be attributed to two main factors: Many individuals who would have reenlisted

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

in January, reenlisted in December to take advantage of leave during Christmas; speculation about redeployment has caused a number of personnel to put off reenlisting for other units in Vietnam because they want to go home with the 3d Brigade.

2. Continued emphasis by the brigade's full-time career counselors is being placed on giving information about Army career opportunities to the individual soldier.

3. In addition, several projects were developed to improve command interest in the reenlistment program at all levels. These include a reenlistment newsletter now being distributed monthly and a Department of the Army Fact Sheet describing redeployment criteria which was distributed to each soldier in the brigade in order to reduce the amount of speculation about redeployment and possible curtailment of Vietnam tours.

4. First Term Reenlistment statistics are listed in Inclosure 7.

(b) During the period, two major projects were completed:

1. The AG Records Management team visited each unit in the brigade and assisted each assigned individual in updating the information in his DA Form 201 File.

2. The AG Strength Management team visited each unit in the brigade and assisted unit clerks in correcting and updating unit strength reports.

(3) Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(a) Special Services Activities.

1. The following USO shows were provided during the period:

The Tony Diamond USO Show

Boxing Champions Handshake Tour

Tom Tulley Handshake Tour

The New Christy Minstrels and Sally Blair USO Show

The Holiday Soul Special USO Show

Johnny Grant Handshake Tour

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

AVRR-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

The Fillmore USO Show

The Dean Davis & Paula Stieff USO Show

## 2. Rest and Recuperation (R & R) Allocations and Utilization:

<u>OUT-OF-COUNTRY</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Allocations	452	503	396
Utilized	511	499	151
Percentage	113%	99%	111%
<u>IN-COUNTRY</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Allocations	118	181	181
Utilized	118	181	181
Percentage	100%	100%	100%

## 2. Special Services Movies:

	<u>Number Shown</u>	<u>Attendance</u>
November	742	23,201
December	749	24,429
January	761	29,312
Total	2,252	79,942

### (b) Postal Activities.

1. During the period, APO 96371 received the annual postal inspection and, on a rating system of Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory, was given a Satisfactory rating.

2. The following statistics indicate the amount of business conducted by APO 96371 during the reporting period:

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVON-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (K2) (U)

	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Money Order Sales	\$256,572.02	\$239,891.39	\$137,359.38
Stamp Sales	\$ 7,842.00	\$ 10,474.00	\$ 5,711.00
Mail Received	289,382 lbs	294,221 lbs	101,672 lbs
Mail Dispatched	44,896 lbs	76,535 lbs	50,394 lbs

3. All postal activities increased greatly during this period due to the Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years holidays.

(c) Awards and Decorations. Awards presented to 3d Brigade personnel appeared to increase greatly since the last period; however, this is actually due to the establishment of the Brigade AG Awards and Decorations Section and the stabilization of the awards processing system after the disruptive effects of the 9th Division redeployment during the previous period. Awards presented during this period are listed in Inclosure 8.

(d) Chaplain Activities.

1. In November, chapels were completed at Tan Tru and Can Giuoc.

2. Two new chaplains joined the brigade during the period, one Presbyterian and the other Baptist.

3. Numerous special services were conducted at Thanksgiving and Christmas at all of the 3d Brigade base camps.

4. Total services for the period were 411 with attendance of 7902.

(c) Surgeon Activities. During this reporting period, the Brigade Surgeon's Office has taken steps to improve its capability of detecting parasitic diseases such as malaria and has also coordinated with the 9th Medical Laboratory for support in drug sensitivity testing of resistant strains of VD-causing bacteria. A program has been initiated to assist in tuberculosis screening for the Vietnamese National Police Forces. Statistics on significant medical cases during the period are presented in Inclosure 9. In general the figures are much higher than those of the previous period. This is explained by the fact that reporting procedures have stabilized now after the initial disruption caused by the redeployment of the 9th Division and the formation of the 3d Brigade as a separate brigade. As a result of this, more complete and accurate reports were received during the current reporting period.

# CONFIDENTIAL

AFS-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Finance Activities. The Brigade Finance Section has continued to provide complete financial services throughout this reporting period. During the period the following significant activities also occurred:

1. All the MPC series 661 which had been taken out of circulation in August 1969, was verified and destroyed.

2. W-2 Forms for all members of the command were prepared and placed in each individual's Finance Records.

(4) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(a) Provost Marshal.

1. During the period the Military Police continued to conduct joint patrols with the Vietnamese Military Police and National Police. This has proven to be a very effective means of maintaining good rapport with Vietnamese authorities and also provides a good image of mutual cooperation to the Vietnamese citizens.

2. Continued emphasis has been placed on marijuana suppression. The Criminal Investigation Section conducts lectures for all replacement personnel and has given guidance to the Brigade Drug Suppression Committee, as well as to commanders and senior NCO's.

3. Statistics of offenses committed during the reporting period are listed in Inclosure 10. Traffic Accidents are listed in Inclosure 11.

(b) Staff Judge Advocate.

1. During the reporting period the following number and types of court-martial were processed and tried:

1	Summary Court-Martial
47	Special Courts-Martial
1	General Court-Martial
3	Special Courts-Martial authorized to issue Bad Conduct Discharge

2. During the period the SJA reviewed 304 Nonjudicial Punishments under the provisions of Article 15, UCMJ, against personnel as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

REF: 1

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

63 Enlisted Personnel, grade E-5 and above

241 Enlisted Personnel, grade E-4 and below

2 During the period the SJA also handled legal matters, such as, wills, powers of attorney, citizenship, taxes, civil suits, and counseling of personnel accused or suspected of criminal acts

(5) Headquarters Commandant Activities. During the reporting period the 3d Brigade has had four different officers as Headquarters Commandant

(a) Security. Burkers on the perimeter have been reinforced and in some cases, rebuilt. Chain link fence has been secured and is being installed as protection against B-40 rockets. New primary and alternate claymore positions have been established and the compound has been ringed with chain link fence. The perimeter lights have been relocated and additional lights added so as to give the guards greater fields of vision forward of the wire at night.

(b) Sanitation. New drainage systems have been constructed to drain standing water off the compound and fill has been brought in to fill in depressions, thus preventing the accumulation of stagnant water. Latrine facilities have been relocated and stringent measures have been taken to insure the rapid elimination of waste material and the daily cleaning of latrines.

(c) Roads in the headquarters area have been regraded, filled in with rock and sealed in order to keep dust to a minimum during the dry season and eliminate erosion during the monsoon season.

### d (C) Intelligence:

#### (1) Discussion:

(a) General: Enemy activity against US Forces in Long An Province during this reporting period continued at a low level. The Dong Xuan Offensive in mid-November was directed mainly at GVN elements with a moderate high point occurring between 6 November and 9 November. Generally, enemy forces engaged in scattered, low level attacks by fire against isolated targets of opportunity and concentrated on disrupting the GVN Pacification Program. The enemy has placed greater emphasis on sapper tactics as shown by the formation of the K7 NVA Sapper Battalion, 1st Ind NVA Regiment which is composed of three sapper companies and a headquarters

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-VN

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

section Throughout the province, the lack of effective rear service support has hampered enemy capabilities severely. Main force units have received only scattered replacements and have difficulty recruiting within the province. To counter this reality, the enemy may have combined two main force units into one as shown by the possible merger of the 26th MF Battalion with the 1st Long An MF Battalion in Can Giuoc District. Local force companies are also lacking replacements and rear service support. These companies are mainly serving as local security and commo-liaison for replacements from Cambodia.

(b) November: Activity during the month of November was highlighted by a planned enemy mid-November offensive known as N-Day. In addition, a PW from the 1st Ind NVA Regiment spoke of the Dong Xuan Offensive which was to start on 6 November and to last three months. However, the offensive was of low intensity as the enemy conducted attacks by fire directed against scattered RF, PF and ARVN units. The enemy launched twenty-two attacks by fire against GVN elements from 6 November to 9 November.

On 14 November, vic XS741649, A/6-31st Inf contacted the enemy resulting in ten NVA KIA. Documents captured in the area identified the MI Section, SR3, and the 520 PF Battalion.

On 15 November, vic XS602594, D/6-31st Inf and A/2-47th Inf engaged the enemy resulting in seven NVA KIA. Captured documents identified the K6 NVA Battalion, 1st Ind NVA Regiment.

On 19 November, vic XS474830, Recon/6-31st Inf working with ACV's found a cache containing 357 pounds of TNT, 30 82mm mortar rounds, 72 RPG-2 rounds, 74 rifle grenades, 160 Chicom grenades, 5000 AK-47 rounds, 82 82mm mortar fuzes and 100 blasting caps.

In a scattered contact on 28 - 30 November, vic XS6858, 2-47th Inf engaged the enemy resulting in 18 enemy KIA and four prisoners. The PWs stated that two aid stations had been destroyed in the contact. Also, captured in the contact area were large amounts of food, medical supplies, documents and other goods. The PWs identified the C313 Chau Thanh LFC, C22 Medical Company, 1st Ind NVA Regiment, and the Minh Phuoc Medical Section.

(c) December: Enemy initiated activity reached a low point during the month of December. Enemy activity was characterized by limited attacks by fire and harassing actions. Direct contact with US or ARVN forces was avoided as the enemy remained dispersed. The main emphasis of enemy activity was focused on the GVN Pacification Program and isolated RF/PF outposts.

# CONFIDENTIAL

AV2B-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

On 12 December, vic XS598590, Ranger Team 21 contacted the enemy resulting in one enemy KIA. The contact continued with 6-31st Inf, 3-17th Cav and Navy gunships resulting in 20 additional enemy KIAs, four K-54 pistols, two AK-47s, one complete 102M Chicom radio, one K-63 radio and miscellaneous documents captured, and one Hoi Chanh who rallied for the C20 Signal Company, 1st Ind. NVA Regiment. Documents taken from a KIA identified the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment Ordnance Section. These documents gave the strengths and weapons rosters of the infantry battalions of the regiment and some support companies.

(d) January: During the month of January, there was somewhat of an increase in enemy activity. The enemy attempted to resupply main force units and the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment in preparation for a possible Tet Offensive beginning in early February. Generally, limited attacks by fire, harassment and anti-pacification operations continued at approximately the same level as during the previous months of the reporting period. The most significant contact was the identification of a new sapper battalion of the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment.

## (2) Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) Recapitulation: During this reporting period, VC/NVA combat effectiveness continued to deteriorate. The enemy's rear service was severely restricted, resulting in critically low strengths of many VC/NVA units. As a result, the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment, despite its own manpower problems, of necessity became the dominate enemy force in Long An Province. All main force units remained dispersed, ostensibly to wait for reinforcements and to avoid contacts that would further drain their strengths and supplies. Local force companies, also crippled by low strength, were used as guides and as security forces for the main force battalions and 1st Ind. NVA Regiment units.

The 6th MF Battalion of SR2 was identified in a contact on 5 December, vic XS636914, resulting in four enemy KIA and two PWs. Another PW, Nguyen Van Bay, C2 Commanding Officer who was captured on 3 January, vic XS685817, b7 B/3-17th Cav revealed that his battalion was almost exclusively NVA. Bay was apparently made a company commander solely because he was a member of the Communist Party. He had no knowledge of his battalion's AO nor did he have any experience with maps.

The 303 MF Battalion remained in Ba Thu, Cambodia and has remained out of significant contacts since 3 August 1969. On 20 January a rallier identified the battalion, although he had not seen his unit since March 1969.

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (H2) (U)

The 1st Ind. NVA Regiment to accomplish goals set within its area of operation was forced to take over almost all offensive actions in SR3. To help accomplish this end, the K7 NVA Sapper Battalion was organized in Ra Thu, Cambodia during July 1969 and was infiltrated sometime in the fall of 1969. The new sapper battalion was not identified in a contact until 12 January when Recon/6-31st Inf captured one PW vic XS599593. The PW stated that the K7 Battalion is composed of three companies; the C25 C Company which operates with the K5 Inf Battalion, vic XS855968, C25 B Company which operates with the K6 NVA Battalion, vic XS5460, C25 A Company which operates with the K4 Battalion, vic XS6568, and a headquarters section, vic XS6260.

The 211 Sapper MF Battalion was identified only once during the reporting period when B & Recon/6-31st Inf captured documents on 27 January, vic XS710646. In general, the subordinate companies of the 211 Sapper Battalion remained dispersed in an effort to conserve strength.

The 265 MF Battalion was engaged in a series of small but draining contacts. The lack of men became so critical that sometime towards the end of 1969, the 265 MF Battalion may have been absorbed by the 1st Long An MF Battalion. The 1st Long An MF Battalion along with the 2d Long An Battalion and the Dong Phu Battalion remained dispersed awaiting reinforcements and supplies. The 1st Long An MF Battalion in particular reportedly has not received supplies since October 1969.

The 520 MF Battalion at the beginning of the reporting period was one of the strongest battalions in SR3, although it had only 175 men. At present it has no more than 50 members as indicated by a PW captured by 118th AHC on 13 January, vic XS732647. Repeated contacts in the month of December accounted for most of the loss of men.

Almost all identification of local force companies came from ralliers who reported low strength and illness in their units. Generally, local force companies have been relegated to guiding main force units along lines of communication, emplacing booby traps, and conducting local security.

During the months of December and January, there has been a marked decrease in the number of enemy initiated incidents. This may be an attempt on the part of the enemy to conserve his forces while he tries to rearm and strengthen his forces for offensive operations sometime just prior to and/or just after Tet 1970. Documents, PWs and agent reports have all indicated that elements of the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment have been assigned the mission of attacking key US and GVN outposts in this coming highpoint.

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVJB-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 1 February 1970

Of special significance is the new K7 NVA Sapper Battalion. This is further indication of the enemy's policy of causing as much damage on friendly forces as possible while exposing himself to a minimum extent.

(b) Current Holdings:

UNIT	STRENGTH	DATE	LOCATION	COORD
<u>1st Inf, NVA Regt.</u>	910 NVA			
K4 NVA Bn	150 NVA	23 Jan PW	Eastern Rach Kien	XS 6671
K5 NVA Bn	150 NVA	10 Jan HC	Tan Tru	XS 5970
K6 NVA Bn	150 NVA	14 Jan Doc	Binh Phuoc	XS 6060
K7 NVA Sapper Bn	190 NVA	26 Jan Doc	Rach Kien, Tan Tru & Binh Phuoc	
<u>Main Force Bn's</u>				
Dong Phm MF Bn	64 VC/NVA	25 Jan Doc	Western Can Giuoc	XS 8073
Long An City Force	23 VC/NVA	30 Sep HC	Eastern Binh Phuoc	XS 5461
1st Long An MF Bn	100 VC/NVA	23 Jan PW	Eastern Can Giuoc	XS 8872
2d Long An MF Bn	70 VC/NVA	21 Jan PW	Western Can Giuoc	XS 7975
3d Arty MF Bn	50 VC/NVA	19 Jan HC	Dispersed in SR3	
6th MF Bn	140 VC/NVA	3 Jan PW	Duc Hoa	XS 6590
211th Sapper MF Bn	120 VC/NVA	27 Jan Doc	Dispersed in SP3	
265th MF Bn	50 VC/NVA	20 Dec PW	Eastern Can Giuoc	XS 8464
308th MF Bn	110 VC/NVA	20 Jan HC	Ba Thu, Cambodia	
520th MF Bn	40 VC/NVA	13 Jan PW	Western Can Duoc	XS 7362
<u>Local Force Companies</u>				
C1 Ben Thu LFC	25 VC/NVA	1 May HC	Southern Ben Luc	XS 5877
C2 Ben Thu LFC	28 VC/NVA	8 Jun HC	Southeast Thu Thua	XS 5071
C1 Can Duoc LFC	2 VC/NVA	14 Jan HC	Central Can Duoc	XS 7662
C2 Can Duoc LFC	12 VC/NVA	3 Jan HC	Central Rach Kien	XS 7270
C1 Can Giuoc LFC	10 VC/NVA	7 Nov Doc	Western Can Giuoc	XS 7671
C2 Tan Tru LFC	15 VC/NVA	13 Nov HC	Southern Tan Tru	XS 6963
C313 Chau Thanh LFC	22 VC/NVA	30 Nov PW	Northern Binh Phuoc	XS 6458
C314 Tan Tru LFC	14 VC/NVA	9 Jan HC	Central Tan Tru	XS 6364

(3) Discussion of Enemy Techniques and Tactics:

During the reporting period, enemy initiated activity remained at a low level of intensity. The month of December and the first week of January were particularly characterized by very few aggressive enemy actions.

The low level of enemy initiated activity continued to reflect the enemy's objectives of continuing only stand-off attacks by fire of a low



# CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

intensity aimed primarily at isolated GVN outposts and poorly defended hamlets. His tendency to avoid contact is a function of his inability to resupply and recruit new members. US and GVN interdiction operations have placed tremendous pressure on the enemy's logistical and infiltration routes, forcing him to conserve his resources.

In addition, the enemy is gradually losing his numerous hiding places and security of his lines of communication as the pacification effort spreads throughout the province. He can consider but few places free to conceal himself from the ever increasing numbers of GVN forces as outposts are being built in areas once considered enemy controlled. As a result, he has adopted the concept of increased sapper operations which involve only a few personnel exposed at a time to recon, plan and conduct attacks while the main body remains dispersed.

This sort of sapper activity was demonstrated effectively by an attack on the Tan Tru District Artillery Compound on 19 November involving an estimated squad of sappers. They entered the compound through the wire, killed several ARVN soldiers, destroyed the fire coordination center and one artillery piece before being killed themselves. The concentration on sapper operations is further reflected by the presence of the newly organized K7 NVA Sapper Battalion, 1st Ind. NVA Regiment.

## (4) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses:

	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
KIA	387	357	338
Detainees	108	74	68
PW	13	12	12
HC	14	3	4
C/S Wpns	4	2	7
S/P Wpns	87	75	64
HE Ammo	375	202	60
Mines	197	68	59
Grain	.045 Ton	3.54 Ton	.015 Ton
Sampans	8	6	13
Structures	20	16	11
Bunkers	222	353	268

## (5) Intelligence Sources and Assets:

(a) Significant Activities and New Techniques in the Area of Counter-intelligence:

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. The Counterintelligence Section (CIS) in keeping with its basic mission, employed during the reporting period six coded sources, four on-post informants (located at Tan An Main Base and Tan An Airfield) and three casual sources for the reporting of intelligence. The sources employed by the CIS produced 186 reports during the reporting period. These reports resulted in 81 enemy KIA, one PW, eight detainees, 15 pounds of documents and a quantity of enemy equipment, including the following:

10 AK47's	1 M16	15 pounds of medical supplies
6 K54's	1 M1	30 Chicom grenades
1 SKS	2 Chicom radios	20 pounds of documents, NVA
1 RPG MG		web gear

2. Copies of all reports have been furnished to S2, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, 2-4th Artillery, and E Company, 75th Infantry (Ranger). These units, or units under their control have provided the combat response to intelligence reports.

3. During this reporting period, CIS initiated close cooperation with the S5, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Through coordination with the S5 office, the CIS has been informed of all ICAP missions of the 3d Brigade. The CIS has provided Special Agent and Interpreter personnel for support of ICAP missions. As a result, CIS has been solicited for suggestions on modifications in ICAP procedures which would maximize the intelligence gathering potentials of such missions. These suggestions will, it is anticipated, result in increased production of intelligence from this area. In January, CIS employed its first Tiger Scout. Working exclusively for CIS, the Scout has led combat units against intelligence targets. The results of this new program have been most gratifying. In two such strikes guided by the CIS Tiger Scout, elements of the 2-47th Inf produced 12 enemy KIA, two VCI eliminated and quantities of weapons, documents and medical supplies confiscated. In a further effort to aid the effectiveness of combat responses to intelligence reports, the CIS has, where applicable, provided a coded source, accompanied by a special agent, to fly in the C & C helicopter during strikes. This technique precludes compromise of either source or special agent and neither are in the area of conflict. The presence of the source and special agent in an advisory capacity to the commander has produced excellent results. Cooperation with the 525th MI Section in Long An Province has provided valuable verification of CIS reports and on occasion, supplemental information. Liaison with the advisors to the Vietnamese National Police, and through them with OSA and MSS personnel has provided CIS with other extremely useful source information. Cooperation has also been established with US Navy Intelligence and SEAL Teams located at Pen Luc. The 14th ARVN MI has continued to work very closely with CIS. Mutual

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVBS-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (1)

exchange of information has enhanced the functioning of both organizations.

### (b) The Prisoner Interrogation Section:

During the reporting period, the IPW Section processed a total of 250 detainees. Of this total, 123 were classified Innocent Civilians, 69 were classified Civil Defendant, 37 were classified PWs and 21 were classified as Hoi Chanh. In addition, the section processed 112 batches of captured documents of which eight were of significant tactical value and approximately 80% contained information useful to Order of Battle. At the same time, approximately 650 pounds of captured material, consisting primarily of captured weapons, clothing and equipment were processed.

### (6) Significant Activities and New Techniques in the Area of Aerial Reconnaissance:

(a) The Imagery Interpretation Section, consistent with its basic mission, accomplished the following during the reporting period: 77 aerial photographic missions were received and plotted. From these missions a total of 34 photo interpretation reports were prepared and disseminated. A total of 65 Red Haze sorties were received, read out, and their results disseminated. Also 65 airborne Sensor Interpretation reports were prepared and disseminated. In response to specific requests, the II Section prepared five photo mosaics, 16 special targeting overlays, one trail overlay, distributed five photo enlargements of base camps, and flew two aerial photo missions.

(b) Thirty-four photographic missions have been cut and packaged with field plots for dissemination to 3d Brigade units.

(c) During the reporting period, the II Section assumed responsibility for photo planning and requesting. All brigade units and separate or attached units submit their requests for aerial photography through S2 Air (Bde) to the II Section or directly to the II Section. The II Section then prepares a formal photo request and forwards it to C2 Air, II FFORCEV where it is assigned to either an Air Force or Army flying unit.

### (7) Weather and Terrain:

During the reporting period, the weather changed from wet, monsoon conditions to the dry season. As the flooded plains dry, both enemy and friendly forces are able to conduct more extensive ground movement.

Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCL CSFOE-65 (R) (U)

As the paddies dry and the water table lowers, more hiding places become accessible to the enemy, and he is able to make more effective use of booby traps. This countered by the ability of friendly units to conduct longer field operations without being plagued as much by immersion foot and by increasing mechanized operations. Also with a decrease in moisture comes a corresponding decrease in early morning fog which significantly improves the capability for night and early morning airmobile operations.

(8) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Possible Course of Action:

(a) The enemy has the capability to:

1. Conduct attacks on Province and District seats, other administrative and military installations.
2. Conduct brief attacks by fire, hide his equipment, and withdraw from the area prior to employment of counter-mortar techniques.
3. Conduct attacks by fire and harassment on towns, villages, hamlets, outposts and other installations.
4. Conduct sniper and terrorists attacks on key bridges, roads, RF projects and population areas.
5. Defend base areas and positions with local security forces and reinforce within a four kilometer area.
6. Disperse major units into platoon and squad size elements.
7. Withdraw and disperse easily.
8. Wage political and psychological warfare on the populace and hold control of any area where there is no friendly security at night.

(b) The enemy is vulnerable to:

1. Loss of support of the population.
2. Friendly superior artillery and air power.
3. Interdiction of the LOCs and loss of cached supplies.
4. Disclosure or capture of attack plan.

# CONFIDENTIAL

FM 1-41

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, ICG CDR-65 (H) (1)

5. Detection by friendly surveillance devices.
6. A breakdown in his infrastructure by aggressive allied actions.
7. A lack of combat effective troops and a low morale due to heavy casualties and desertions.
8. A loss of logistical support which has resulted in a lack of food and medicine making him vulnerable to hunger, disease, and complication of wounds.

(c) From all appearances it seems the enemy will direct his main effort towards countering the Pacification Program and concentrate on sapper techniques as opposed to larger unit tactics.

## (9) New Techniques:

Intelligence reports and PW readouts have indicated that enemy movement during the hours of darkness along lines of communication was being conducted by widely dispersed groups. It was apparent that resupply and replacement was being conducted in this manner, especially in preparation for Tet 70, and that large scale night operations were not effectively interdicting enemy movement. Consequently, 65% of the brigade's operations were conducted at night during the reporting period, concentrating on the technique of saturation ambushes. Forces were deployed in squad to half platoon size ambush patrols providing extended area coverage. This technique has proven effective in interdicting night movement as indicated in a document captured by Recon/6-31st Inf on 12 January, in which a member of the headquarters element, 1st Ind NVA Regiment relates the "Enemy" situation Sub Region 3:

"The enemy completely controls ((this area)) in the daytime; now he gradually exercises control at night.... Before, the enemy usually moved out with a large personnel strength; now, his personnel strength is small. He also dares in darkness to land one or two aircraft to set up an ambush against us.... Now, at some places in our operational area, the enemy has learned that we dare not operate in the daytime, so he relaxes during the daytime and begins to move out at night-fall. He tries to avoid our attacks and also sets up ambushes to obstruct our lines of communications. Our men run away when they meet the enemy." (Ref: CDRG Bul No. 28,460)

## (1) Techniques of Radar Employment:

AVBB-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS GCFOR-69 (P) (U)

During the reporting period, Brigade Ground Surveillance Radar aggressively pursued the brigade policy of offensive radar operations. The eight organic AN/FPS-5 radars and one direct support AN/TPS-25 radar detected 4470 sightings resulting in 656 artillery fire missions including illumination for troop insertions.

Because of the period of operations, 1900 to 0500 hours, artillery fire on radar detected targets is unobserved. The results of the fire are unobtainable until first light, hours after the fire has ceased, and after the enemy has had a chance to remove or hide any bodies. The inability to assess radar by numbers killed does not alter the fact that radar has effectively denied the enemy regularly used lines of communication. This was witnessed by the marked shift in routes following radar employment at several locations in the Plain of Reeds with fire support bases. Following the radar placement at FSB Shiloh, FSB Gettysburg, and FSB Manassas after just several periods of operation, airborne sensor patterns detected a noticeable shift in activity to areas outside the effective range of radar coverage.

In addition to the nighttime target acquisition and LOC interdiction, Ground Surveillance Radar has been effectively employed to accurately locate friendly units for artillery control and to aid ACV's in navigation in the Plain of Reeds where otherwise it would have been extremely difficult and time consuming.

e. ) Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division entered Phase IV of Operation Toan Thang. The 3d Brigade accounted for 1022 enemy killed, 37 prisoners of war and 21 Hoi Chanh while participating in this operation during the reporting period. The brigade conducted offensive operations in Long An Province with four maneuver battalions: 2-47th Inf (Mech), 2-60th Inf, 5-60th Inf, and 6-31st Inf.

(2) The level of enemy activity in Long An Province continued at a reduced level, and the Communists continued to avoid decisive engagements with brigade forces.

(3) Airmobile operations during the day and saturation ambush patrols at night continued to be the brigade's principle tactics for keeping the enemy on the defensive. The percentage of enemy eliminated at night during this reporting period is somewhat lower than in the previous period. It is felt that this is primarily a result of the technique of saturation engaged with many small ambush patrols. When this technique was initially employed,

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVBBLMH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry  
Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS CCFUR-65 (R2) (U)

the enemy eliminated at night. There was a significant increase; however, the enemy has been forced to reevaluate his activities during the hours of darkness as his maneuver capabilities have been effectively diminished.

(4) The brigade continues to conduct combined operations at the optimum level. The effectiveness of these operations is evidenced by the fact that GVN Forces in Long An Province are producing better results. Technical aspects of such techniques as radar employment, duffel bag employment and monitoring, etc. will be stressed in future operations and training programs to assist the GVN Forces in total vietnamization.

### (5) Combat Operations:

(a) On 090201 November Ranger Team 17 was inserted vic XS 690692 on a radar sighting of five personnel. At 0250 hours the team engaged three enemy resulting in one Communist KIA (BC) and one AK-47 captured. At 0300 hours the team engaged three more enemy resulting in two Communists KIA (BC) and two AK-47's captured. On 151100 November elements of B/6-31st Inf were inserted vic XS 602591 in reaction to a Yellow Jacket report. They engaged two enemy resulting in two Communists KIA (BC). That evening A/2-7th Inf established AP's in the area. At 2200 hours A Co engaged a reinforced squad of enemy with artillery firing illumination and HE in support. A sweep in the morning revealed results of six Communists KIA (BC) credited to artillery and five Communists KIA (BC) credited to A/2-47th Inf. On 19 November Recon/6-31st Inf, working with the ACV's in the Plain of Reeds found a cache in the vic XS 474830. The cache consisted of 72 B-40 rounds, 74 rifle grenades, 30 82mm mortar rounds, 357 pounds of TNT, 160 Chicon grenades, 5000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 100 blasting caps and 82 82mm mortar fuses. That evening a Ranger Team from E/75th Inf (Ranger) was inserted at the cache site as a stay behind patrol. At 0025 hours the team engaged three enemy resulting in three Communists KIA (BC), two sampans destroyed, 48 B-40 rounds, 20 containers of anti-tank grenades and miscellaneous equipment captured. At 261615 November B/2-60th Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force vic XS 542583, with negative results. A false extraction of the B Co element was made, and the unit established AP's in the contact area. At 1840 hours the unit made contact with a squad of enemy. Air cavalry, artillery and Night Hawk were in support. At 2000 hours contact broke resulting in seven Communists KIA (BC), one AK-47 captured and one prisoner apprehended. At 281610 November Recon/2-47th Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force vic XS 680580. Artillery and air cavalry were in support. At 1635 hours Recon engaged and killed two communists KIA (BC) and captured two AK-47's. Contact broke at 1700 hours, and Recon established AP's in the area. The following day at 0905 hours, Recon discovered an enemy base camp, capturing

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVEB-PH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 3 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

numerous supplies and destroying a bunker and tunnel complex. Continuing the sweep through the area, 2-47th Inf found three Communists KBA (BC) credited to artillery, captured two small arms weapons and captured two prisoners. At 1910 hours five more bodies were found, credited three Communists KIA (BC) to Recon and two Communists KBA (BC) credited to B/3-17th Cav.

(b) On 020505 December via XS 360875 Recon/6-31st Inf, working with the ACV's engaged approximately eleven enemy personnel. Negative return fire was received, and a subsequent sweep at daylight revealed results of five Communists KIA (BC). On 072115 December one Ranger Team from E/75th Inf (Ranger) was inserted on a radar sighting via XS 864703. The team engaged six to eight personnel resulting in four Communists KIA (BC). On 120745 December a Ranger Team conducting para-sect operations was inserted on an intelligence target four kilometers NAW of Binh Phuoc, via XS 598590. The team immediately established contact with the enemy and engaged and killed one Communist KIA (BC). B/3-17th Cav gunships were in support and engaged four more enemy evading. D/6-31st Inf, the airmobile company for the day, was diverted from preplanned targets to the contact area, and the first element was inserted at 0845 hours. The Ranger Team, after capturing three 60mm mortar rounds and two K-54 pistols, was extracted from the area. At 0957 hours a B/3-17 Cav LCH, working with the ground elements, received several rounds of small arms fire resulting in five hits to the aircraft and one US WIA (observer). Approximately 1000 hours Navy Seawaves and Black Ponies were on station to support the contact. B/3-17th Cav gunships, AHC gunships and artillery were also in support. Contact continued throughout the day and broke at 2030 hours. Results of the operation were 28 Communists KIA (BC), eleven small arms captured, one prisoner captured, two Chaicom radios captured (one M102E and K63), and numerous documents captured. Document revealed that the enemy force consisted of elements of the regimental signal support unit for the 1st Ind. NVA Regiment. Friendly casualties were two US KIA and five US WIA. On 141245 December elements of B/2-60th Inf were airmobile inserted via XS 736648. During the insertion the 1.8th AHC gunships engaged and killed seven Communists KBA (BC). At 1315 hours B Co received sniper fire resulting in one US WIA. At 1600 hours B Co gained and maintained contact with the enemy force. Contact broke at 1900 hours with 17 additional Communists KIA (BC), eight small arms, 18 NVA back packs, seven B-40 rounds, one mortar sight and one pound of documents captured. Friendly casualties were one US KIA and four US WIA. At 212145 December Recon/2-47th Inf came in contact with an enemy platoon in the vicinity of the right Mouse Bar (XS 698559). Fire was returned with organic weapons, and artillery, air cavalry, Night Hawk and Shadow aircraft were in support of the ground elements. Additional 2-47th Inf elements were inserted to the north of the contact area to act as a blocking force as

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

sporadic contact continued throughout the night. At 220000 December the contact area was swept revealing enemy losses of eleven Communists KIA (BC) (seven for 2-47th Inf, three for B/3-17th Cav and one for artillery), three AK-47's, twenty 200 foot rolls of electrical wire and miscellaneous documents captured. At 231930 December vic XS713745 CRIP/5-60th Inf engaged a reinforced squad of Communists with artillery and air cavalry in support. Contact broke at 2020 hours but was reestablished at 2040 hours as aircraft in the area drew enemy fire. Sporadic contact continued until 2200 hours. At 2205 hours the Raider platoon, at a nearby AP, engaged two Communists evading from the contact area resulting in two Communists KIA (PC). A sweep of the contact area the following morning revealed additional enemy losses of eight Communists KIA (BC) credited to CRIP platoon. At 262143 December C/2-47th Inf engaged a reinforced squad of Communists in the vicinity of the Rach Tam Tu Canal (XS634586). Artillery fired illumination and HE in support. Contact broke at 2220 hours resulting in five Communists KBA (BC) for artillery and five Communists KIA (BC) for C Co.

(c) On 020230 January B/6-31st Inf engaged four Communists vic XS351P63 resulting in four Communists KIA (BC). During a daylight sweep the B Co element engaged an additional three Communists resulting in three Communists KIA (BC). The sweep also produced six AK-47's captured and four sampans destroyed. On 3 January a B/3-17th Cav LOH on a LR spotted one Communist evading vic XS685817. The Communist was picked up and returned to Tan An where it was revealed that he was a Local Force Company Commander. On 120830 January Ranger Team 17 was inserted vic XS59P590, the site of a significant contact on 12 December 1969. B/3-17th Cav in support engaged and killed two Communists KBA (BC). The Rangers sustained two US WIA from a command detonated booby trap. Elements of the 6-31st Inf, who furnished the airmobile company for the day, was diverted to the contact area, and elements of D Co and Recon platoon were inserted at 0945 hours. At 1000 hours a B/3-17th Cav LOH received ground fire resulting in one US WIA and slight damage to the aircraft. D Co sustained three US WIA from a grenade booby trap with trip wire at 1010 hours. Artillery was fired into the area, and Recon platoon found one Communist KBA (BC). The B/3-17th Cav LOH returned on station at 1030 hours and was shot down by enemy small arms fire, destroying the aircraft and seriously wounding the pilot. D Co found two Communists KBA (BC) credited to B/3-17th Cav and one AK-47. Contact continued throughout the morning, and at 1325 hours D Co sustained one US KIA from gunshot wounds. Ground elements were pulled back, and artillery, Navy and B/3-17th Cav gunships and Tac Air saturated the area with fires. Recon platoon swept the contact area and found five Communists KBA (BC), four for artillery and one for B/3-17th Cav. They also captured two prisoners and two small arms weapons. D Co was pulled out of the area, and A Co inserted to set up blocking positions to prevent the enemy from escaping. Throughout the

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVBR-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CREF-65 (R2) (U)

night Tac Air and artillery continued placing fire in the contact area. The following morning A Co and Recon platoon swept the contact area, finding 26 additional Communists KIA (AC), one prisoner, three AK-47's and ten pounds of medical supplies captured. At 261210 January vic XS 710630 two LCH's and a Cobra gunship from B/3-17th Cav were conducting a VR of a proposed airmobile target when all three aircraft received ground fire, each sustaining two hits with negative casualties and minor damage to the aircraft. 6-31st Inf, who furnished the airmobile company for the day, immediately responded by inserting B Co into the area. Recon/6-31st Inf was already on the ground in the vicinity of the target area and swept towards the B Co elements. At 1320 hours B/3-17th Cav gunships engaged and killed two Communists KBA (BC) evading. Recon platoon and B Co maintain sporadic contact with the enemy throughout the day with artillery, Tac Air and air cavalry in support. At 1600 hours Recon platoon sustained one US KIA from gunshot wounds, and shortly thereafter, D Co engaged and killed two Communists KIA (BC) evading. Both 6-31st Inf elements established AF's in the contact area that evening with artillery and Tac Air continuing fires into the area. At 2050 hours B Co found one RPG launcher and destroyed five bunkers, while at the same time nearby, Recon platoon engaged and killed one Communist KIA (BC) evading. The following morning, while sweeping the contact area, B Co engaged and killed one Communist KIA (BC). At 0740 hours Recon found one AK-47. At 1000 hours the Recon platoon found two AK-47's, one K-54 pistol, five RPG rounds, a small quantity of small arms ammunition and miscellaneous documents and equipment. While continuing their sweep, B Co found two Communists KBA (BC) credited to the Air Force at 1000 hours. Shortly thereafter, the same element found two Communists KBA (BC) credited five to the Air Force and five to artillery. On 17 January Ranger Team 17 established an ambush patrol vic XS 515799 after being alerted by ACV's. At 1740 hours the team engaged four enemy resulting in four Communists KIA (BC) and one U slightly wounded. Artillery supported with illumination fires and the Rangers swept the contact area capturing four homemade radio receivers, four NVG back packs, one AK-47 and miscellaneous clothes and documents. The team was extracted at 2010 hours.

(6) Combat Statistics - Inclosure 13.

(7) Combat Support Activities:

(a) Artillery Support:

1. Artillery support for the 3d Brigade during this reporting period continued to be provided by the 23rd Battalion, 4th Field Artillery, the organic direct support artillery battalion. Battalions 4 and 5, 5th Battalion, 42d Field Artillery with missions of general support priority

## CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

of fires to the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery continued to provide medium artillery support in the 3d Brigade TAOI. Heavy artillery support provided by an element of the 7th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery was withdrawn. A summary of the total missions and rounds fired are provided as Inclosure 14.

2. Significant operational activities of the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery is attached as Inclosure 20.

(b) Helicopter Gunship Support:

1. During the reporting period Troop B/3-17th Cav was in direct support of the 3d Brigade, providing an average of ten armed helicopters per day. This support consisted of four AG-1G Cobra gunships, three OH-6A LOHs, and three UH-1H slicks on a daily basis. Missions included support for 3d Brigade units in contact, aerial displacement of supplies, people sniffer operations, defoliation missions, screening and blocking operations, aerial reconnaissance, Ranger insertions, Ranger parakeet flights and Ranger extractions. While in support of the 3d Brigade during this reporting period B/3-17th Cav flew 6048.3 hours and accounted for 105 VC KDA (DC).

2. The 3d Brigade elements also received gunships from the US Navy located at Ben Luc, Dinh Thoy, and Nha Be. The US Navy supported elements of the 3d Brigade on a mission basis with a light fire team (LFT).

(c) Tactical Air Support: A chart reflecting ordnance expended and results obtained by Tac Air in support of 3d Brigade units attached as Inclosure 15.

(d) Strategic Air Support: There were no B52 strikes conducted in support of the 3d Brigade during the reporting period.

f. (C) Training:

(1) During the reporting period the following training was conducted within the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division:

- (a) Replacement Training.
- (b) Battalion Refresher Training.
- (c) In-country Specialized Training.

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB:MMH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS CSFOW-65 (12) (U)

(2) Replacement training consisted of five days of orientation and intensive training in many of the skills necessary to prepare an individual for combat duty in Vietnam. The "Go Devil Academy", a provisional organization within this command, conducted all replacement training during this period. Additional land acquired during October 1969 was put into use in mid-November as a training area for patrolling, booby traps, water safety replacement personnel training during the reporting period:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
November	24	276
December	18	699
January	44	679
TOTAL	86	1,614

(3) Battalion refresher training continued to be conducted by all subordinate maneuver units of this command. The primary emphasis was placed on training replacement personnel in these subjects of interest to the Battalion Commander. By continuous training and command supervision, all replacement personnel are given periodic practical training in combat related subjects. Commanders are required to conduct such training to give practical experience to these replacement personnel who have been trained in a non-combat MOS.

(4) The Brigade Sniper Training Program continued to produce highly qualified snipers for employment throughout Long An Province. All brigade snipers were trained at the 25th Infantry Division Sniper School located at Cu Chi, RVN. During the reporting period a total of 21 personnel were trained as snipers. Additionally, snipers accounted for 81 enemy eliminated in Long An Province during the period. A total of 79 kills were attained at night utilizing a starlight scope. The brigade sniper program will continue to accelerate as selected personnel are properly trained and utilized during all operations.

(5) Personnel from all battalions and separate companies have been sent to the following courses offered at Cu Chi, RVN:

- (a) Generator Operator Course.
- (b) Generator Operator Supervisors Course.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1971

Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

- (c) Small Arms Course.
- (d) Mess Management.
- (e) Explosives and Demolitions Course.
- (f) Helicopter Load Preparation Course.
- (g) Combat Leadership Course.

(6) In addition, personnel have been sent to the 1st Signal Brigade for technical instruction on radar, signal communications and audio-visual classes. Qualified personnel continue to attend the MACV Reconno School at Nha Trang and the Phoenix Orientation Course at Vung Tau.

(7) This headquarters has conducted specialized training in Generator Maintenance, PLL, and Demolitions at the "Go Devil Academy" and units, utilizing instructors from out-of-brigade resources. This enables a greater number of personnel to attend and in the case of the Generator Operator and Maintenance Course, enhance training by utilizing local equipment.

g. (C) Logistics:

(1) General: (a) The logistical mission of providing planning, guidance and support for all organic and attached units of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was accomplished by the Brigade S4 during the reporting period. The major tactical units supported were five land based battalions.

(b) During the reporting period, a forward element of the Brigade S4 was attached to a Brigade Task Force located at FSB Gettysburg to coordinate the logistical requirements of the Task Force.

(2) Supply: (a) 3d Brigade units drew supplies for the 99th CS Support Battalion located at Tan An Airfield on a supply point distribution basis. Unit distribution of all classes of supplies was provided to FSB Gettysburg.

(b) A small rearm/refuel point for helicopters was established at FSB Gettysburg to allow greater flexibility in operations.

(c) A water point was also established at FSB Gettysburg to provide potable water for the Task Force.

(3) Maintenance: (a) 99th CS Support Battalion, 56th Signal Company and 571st Engineer Company received the annual CMMI during the reporting

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS GSFOR-65 (E2) (U)

period. It was determined that maintenance contact teams should be formed to provide assistance and advice to brigade units.

(b) Roadside spot checks and informal inspections were conducted by B Company, 99th CS Support Battalion, throughout the period. The spot checks, together with continuous command emphasis on vehicular maintenance, have resulted in a low deadline rate in most areas. Generator deadline continues to be one of the higher areas, due to constant operation, but increased emphasis has reduced this somewhat.

(4) Transportation: Organic transportation was adequate to meet limited tactical and most administrative requirements. However, in the latter part of the period (December-January) non-organic transportation was relied on heavily to support FSB Gettysburg. CH-47 sorties for this purpose averaged 4-6 per day. These sorties were obtained for the 25th Infantry Division. 48th Transportation Group provided backup truck support when organic transportation was inadequate.

#### h. (C) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs:

##### (1) Psychological Operations:

(a) The 3d Brigade PSYOPS effort continued to support the Long An Province Pacification and Development Program. The objectives of PSYOPS during the period have been:

1. Quick reaction broadcasts and leaflet drops to exploit enemy personnel and equipment losses and perishable intelligence information.
2. To convince the civilian population that the pacification and development program is an expression of the response of the GVN to the needs of the people.
3. To create dissention VC and NVA by exploiting personality differences.
4. Utilization of the Family Tree program to create dissention between higher and lower level of command.

(b) The continued use of PSYOPS during all combat operations is being emphasized. Combat units are giving the enemy a more open chance to Chieu Hoi rather than to be killed in his hole or bunker.

(c) Major themes during the reporting period were: Chieu Hoi, Family Tree, GVN image, VIP, Tet, surrender/scare hardship, health and sanitation, pest control, and pacification.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVPB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, ICS GCFOR-65 (12) (U)

(d) Summary of PSYOP activities:

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>LCURSFAKER</u>	<u>LEAFLETS</u>	<u>QUICK REACTION</u>
	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>TARGETS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Air	157	947	20,303,250
Ground	1006	1156	2,515,133
			1781 1948

(2) Civil Affairs:

(a) Throughout the reporting period Civic Actions have been aimed at helping the province level G5 more fully use its assets and capabilities through combined operations. Two of these operations were held in remote areas of the province.

(b) Promotion of safety program in weapons and vehicles.

(c) Summary of MILCIP programs for the reporting period:

<u>NITECAPS</u>	<u>ICAPS</u>	<u>MEDCAPS</u>	<u>DENTCAPS</u>	<u>PATIENTS TREATED</u>
243	448	1469	79	88,588

(d) Civic Actions also included construction projects to improve living conditions within Long An Province. These were targeted for short duration-high impact results. The following is a list of projects completed:

1. Dwellings                      12
2. Roads                              3Km
3. Brigades                        7 Built, 3 repaired
4. Schools                         8 Repaired
5. Others                            2 Staircases repaired, District Headquarters office buildings

(e) Materials distributed for construction:

1. Cement                        221 bags
2. Tin                              51 Sheets

## CONFIDENTIAL

3. Lumber 6606 board foot

(f) During the conduct of MILCARS the teams distributed various health items and commodities.

1. Health and School kits	1406
2. Foodstuffs	3625 lbs
3. Clothing	1876 lbs
4. Other	2522 lbs, pencil, paper, sand bags, sand, rock, link fence, Vn Flags, jump ropes, candy

(g) Thirty-two English Pronunciation classes were conducted with a total of 200 students.

(h) Units of the 3d Brigade continued to arrange for medical treatment and corrective surgery for needy children at Cho Ray Hospital and amputees at the National Rehabilitation Institute. The following treatments were performed during the reporting period:

1. Tuberculosis	1
2. Post Op Hernia	2
3. Burns	1
4. Infection	1
5. Abscess	1
6. Club foot	5
7. Shrapnel wounds	2
8. Body Ulcers	2
9. Unknown diseases	8
10. Artificial leg	2

1. (c) Engineer Support:

(i) Construction continued in support of the reorganization of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division as a Separate Light Infantry Brigade.

## CONFIDENTIAL



AVRR-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Two administrative buildings remain to be constructed. This construction is being performed by elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade.

(2) Construction continues on Operational Support Projects. These include the following:

- (a) Communications Bunker, Tan An Main (90% complete)
- (b) Dog kennels, Tan An Airfield (70% complete)
- (c) Deep well point, Tan An Airfield (50% complete)
- (d) Air Cushion Vehicle ramp, Ben Luc
- (e) Barr construction, Tan An Airfield

(3) There are five MER projects currently planned for Tan An Airfield, to be accomplished by elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade. They include fixed and rotary wing aircraft revetments, a rearm point, and a refueling point.

(4) This period marked the end of the monsoon season. The major portion of engineer effort is now concentrated on projects requiring borrow material while the land is dry.

(5) During the period the major portion of the engineer effort in the Brigade TACI was devoted to the Long An Province Secondary Road Program. This program consists of opening or upgrading to all weather use 206 km of roads within the province. Priorities of effort were agreed upon between the Brigade Commander, the Long An Province Chief, and II Field Force. The roads, permit greater economic contact between residents of the formerly isolated villages and the larger cities of the area, and allows GVN services and security to reach the hamlets. Work is underway on twelve of the roads, and 28 km are completed. Road priorities are readjusted based upon the overall pacification plan, with the last adjustment made on 31 December 1969. The work is shared by elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade, the 571st Engineer Company, Navy Sea Bee Team 1015, and the ARVN 39th Engineer Group.

#### j. (C) Signal Support:

(1) During the reporting period, the Brigade Signal Office continued its normal operations to include advising the Brigade Commander on all signal matters, coordinating and tasking the commitment of the 56th Signal

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Company assets, coordinating the signal operations of the separate organic battalions, and preparing and managing the 3d Brigade Signal Operating Instructions (SOI).

(2) The communications systems within the brigade have not changed significantly since the last reporting period (see paragraph 1 of 56th Signal Company ORLL, Inclosure 25.)

(3) The major communications emphasis during the reporting period has been on upgrading Communications Security (COMSEC) with the 3d Brigade. This program has received increased emphasis since 20 December 1968 when the US Forces discovered conclusive evidence that the enemy is quite sophisticated in gathering vital intelligence from our careless use of the various communications media at our disposal. The brigade's program of upgrading COMSEC includes greater use of NESTOR secure voice equipment; greater use of authorized codes and discontinuance of unauthorized codes on non-secure media; and an education program to familiarize officers and RTO's with the enemy's capabilities, our weaknesses and necessary corrective measures to be instituted. The ultimate goal of the program is to virtually deny the enemy access to useable intelligence via our communications media. To attain this goal it is planned to have all the brigade and battalion level nets operate in secure voice. Other nets will operate secure voice when it is feasible; otherwise, maximum use of authorized codes as the situation warrants will effectively eliminate enemy Communications Intercept (COMINT) activities.

(4) Resupply and maintenance has been very good with two notable exceptions. The supply system has a difficult time keeping up with the attrition rate of the AT-271 antenna which snaps off at the stem when caught in the nipa. Handsets (H-189) also have a high rate of attrition after becoming wet. These DX items; however, DS maintenance is unable to repair many of the handsets and must send them to higher echelon. Requisitions have been submitted on these items, but they are a critical item countrywide.

k. (C) Chemical Operations:

(1) During the reporting period, the 39th Chemical Detachment continued personnel detection operations, application of RCA, defoliation missions, and flame operations in support of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

(2) Personnel Detectors XM3-Airborne Personnel Detector (APD):

(a) During the reporting period 147 missions were flown for a total flying time of 125.75 hours. All missions were flown utilizing the UH-1H

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, ROL CSFCH-6 (U)

Results of these missions were reported to Brigade G2 and/or air cavalry units for inclusion in their intelligence reports.

(b) There is a continual problem with maintenance due to the unserviceability of the power source which is necessary for trouble shooting the sniffer equipment. The power source has been submitted to a different electronic repair company in an attempt to regain the capability of maintenance to organizational level.

## (3) Riot Control Agent Operations:

(a) During the reporting period there were no missions flown utilizing Blank CS, due to lack of suitable targets.

(b) There were 53 B-158 tactical CS clusters expended during the reported period. These were employed on point type targets developed from sniffer readings and on "gas ambushes".

## (4) Defoliation:

(a) During the reporting period no defoliation projects were forwarded through channels. This was due to the fact that all area suitable for aerial spray have been submitted and there are 41 targets pending approval which were submitted last quarter.

(b) All base camps have been supplied with herbicides for ground defoliation within their perimeter.

(c) From 4 January to 17 January three missions were flown for Can Gio basecamp using diesel fuel as a substitute for herbicide. A total of 890 gallons of diesel was dispersed in an attempt to kill the vegetation around the perimeter in preparation for later burning.

(5) Flame Field Expedients: The "Flame Bath", an expedient delivered by means of helicopter, has been largely discontinued because of possible hazards to aircraft and crew. For the three month period six "Flame Baths" were employed with excellent results on heavily vegetated areas.

(6) Instruction and Training: A fully qualified Chemical Staff Specialist (54F20) is furnished as needed, to Go Devil Academy to instruct replacements on Chemical Operations. He has replaced a non-school trained instructor from the general subjects committed and has provided 31 classes for a total of 23 hours of instruction during the reporting period.

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB-121

1 February 1970

Subject: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, and CSFO-65 (R2) (C)

1. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel: None

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Response to Intelligence Reports.

OBSERVATION: It has been observed that the principle communist tactic has been to disperse men in small units, which stay on the move much of the time.

EVALUATION: This tactic has dictated the necessity of accurate intelligence reports which can be acted upon with speed and precision. When intelligence reports judged to have a good potential for combat response are received, the S2, 3d Brigade and E Company, 75th Infantry (Ranger) are informed verbally of the location and nature of the target immediately. If a combat response is deemed appropriate by those responsible, they are prepared to support such a response by furnishing Air Cannon Scout guidance where applicable or makes the source and special agent available to brief the combat commander, or assist the commander by guiding the strike from the C & C helicopter. This technique has proven highly successful on numerous occasions. Although it has placed a burden on CI, due to lack of personnel, it has greatly enhanced the quality of support provided to the 3d Brigade by CI.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that other units employ this technique in responding to intelligence reports.

(2) Enemy Use of Signals to Indicate US Ambushes in Hootch Areas

OBSERVATION: The enemy has devised signals to indicate US troops ambushes set up around hootches.

EVALUATION: Report from an ICAP on 29 January 1970 stated that the enemy told the people in the vicinity of Tan Trach Village, Rach Kien District to indicate the presence of a US ambush in a hootch area by leaving the light on in the hootch within which or around which the ambush was set up. All other hootches should extinguish their lights. People should stay inside their bunkers, and the enemy would attack with AK's and B-40's.

RECOMMENDATION: That all ambush patrols be made aware of the possibility of this and other enemy signaling methods. That ambush patrols exercise special care and alertness when setting up near population.

\*Counterintelligence Section

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational report--for the learned of 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS 3250-65 (12) (C)

### c. (3) Operations:

#### (1) Gas Employment

**OBSERVATION:** The newly used "Gas Ambush" is being utilized in an attempt to force the enemy into established ambush sites.

**EVALUATION:** There has been negative results from this operation to date.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Through coordination is necessary between the ground element and personnel making the drop. A complete briefing of the target area is necessary to assure accuracy on the target. Optimum drop altitude is approximately 850 feet to maximize coverage and dispersion. All ground elements should carry protective masks to the ambush site.

#### (2) Using Bangalore Torpedoes to Clear a Safe Path Through Dense Vegetation.

**OBSERVATION:** When trying to penetrate dense, booby trapped nipapalm, the bangalore torpedo may be used to clear a safe path through the dense vegetation.

**EVALUATION:** The VC/NVA often use dense areas of nipapalm as resting or hiding places. The enemy will often protect these areas by surrounding them with booby traps. Units trying to penetrate these areas may effectively clear a safe path through the nipapalm by the detonation of bangalore torpedoes. The bangalore torpedoes will clear away vegetation and destroy the booby traps along the path. A unit can either carry the bangalore torpedo in sections or be supplied by helicopter.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That bangalore torpedoes be used to blast safe paths through thick nipapalm.

#### (3) Bunker Complex in Nipapalm.

**OBSERVATION:** Enemy bunkers may be found in either heavy or open nipapalm and are usually constructed to provide 360 degrees of security.

**EVALUATION:** In two significant contacts it was discovered the enemy was in bunkers which afforded him the capability to fire in all directions. On one occasion the bunkers were in a circle with firing ports to the front of the bunker. On another, they were set in depth with firing ports of the first line of bunkers facing to the sides and front, and those in the back line facing in 360 degrees.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

W-1-11

1 February 1970

1. SUMMARY: Operational Report--Locations learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, period ending 31 January 1970, RGS 0000-05 (12) (6)

The enemy bunkers were well constructed with the majority of the bunker being below ground level. In heavy mopa it is impossible to detect a bunker until you are right on top of it.

RECOMMENDATION: If contact is made and the enemy is in well concealed and constructed bunkers, the infantry should be used to seal the area while artillery and Tac Air are brought into the area. It takes almost a direct hit with artillery to knock out a bunker, therefore, nothing should be spared in softening up the area. In cases where there are insufficient troops to provide a 360 degree seal, artillery and Tac Air should be used to fill the gaps.

### (4) Night Airmobile Raids.

OBSERVATION: The use of helicopters at night to deliver a raid force on a target capitalizes on mobility and shock action to a greater extent than mechanized or footmobile troops.

EVALUATION: The use of helicopters at night for troop insertions is not a normal procedure. The enemy is not mentally or physically prepared to react to a night airmobile insertion. Certain conditions must be met for a night airmobile raid to be successful. A minimum of fifty percent natural illumination is necessary for navigation. Artillery or mortar illumination should be used after the element is on the ground. Gunships should fire suppressive fire on the target or as close as possible to pin the enemy down. A command and control aircraft is necessary to insure the correct landing zone is used and to control subsequent action.

RECOMMENDATION: That this technique be included in the appropriate training manuals.

### (5) Enemy Carelessness at Night.

OBSERVATION: The enemy often talk loudly while moving at night.

EVALUATION: It has been reported many times recently by ambush patrols that they were alerted to the enemy presence by the loud talking of the enemy moving near the ambush site. It is unlikely that the enemy would be so careless if we were aware of friendly troops in the area.

RECOMMENDATION: That all friendly elements be made aware of this carelessness of the enemy and that they be urged to make special efforts at noise discipline moving into and occupying night positions to exploit this weakness.

CONFIDENTIAL

/s/ [Signature] 10/10/79

65-65 (2) (c)

...and the

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)

by many water

is more negative.

increased. In

small waterways.

An ambush was

ity on 23 January

ed.

1-121 1 February 1970  
 Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry  
 Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, AOS GOFOR-65 (42) (U)

**EVALUATION:** Excellent effect was observed using shell WP for close-in defensive fires with the same data used for HE "Killer Junior". Although the heavier weight of the WP projectile caused a lower height of burst, the burning effect on the ground was good. There is very little by a spray from the exploding round, thus permitting good protection to friendly troops while providing good, effective, close-in defensive fire on the enemy. Extreme care must be exercised during the dry season to prevent the round from starting an unwanted fire.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That commands concerned be informed of the use of shell WP for close-in defensive fires.

(9) Employment of HE "Killer Junior" for Maximum Effect.

**OBSERVATION:** The data on the standard "Killer Junior" chart was found to be inaccurate for the listed range.

**EVALUATION:** When the chart data for the HE "Killer Junior" was fired at each range, most of the rounds fired on impact. The same results were obtained with several different time fuze lots and several different projectile lots. Calibration were set on the range quadrants and extremely high heights of burst were observed. Generally it was found that by reducing the time setting by 0.3 to 0.4 of a second, the desired height of burst was obtained. The same results were obtained using the chart time, by increasing the quadrant approximately 10 mils.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That as soon as possible after moving into a new position, firing batteries verify their "Killer Junior" data. That adjusted data be placed on range cards and made readily available to all personnel near the howitzer.

(10) Utilizing the AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar to Verify Dufflebag Field Locations

**OBSERVATION:** Verifying the location of dufflebag fields in areas of uniform terrain and few landmarks is extremely difficult.

**EVALUATION:** The accuracy of dufflebag field locations is extremely important if artillery fire is to be effective. The AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar, with its range capability of 18,000 meters, can sight on a hovering helicopter, or any other means used to emplace dufflebags, in order to give a more accurate location for each field.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That commands concerned be informed of this additional capability of the AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar.



## CONFIDENTIAL

AVBB:MH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry  
Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

d. (U) Organization: None

e. (U) Training: None

f. (C) Logistics:

(1) Water Point for Remote Fire Support Base.

OBSERVATION: Supplying water to a remote fire support base can cause problems, especially where organic transportation is limited.

EVALUATION: To preclude this occurrence, a portable water purification unit was placed at FSB Gettysburg. This water point not only reduced transportation requirements, but also provided all the portable water necessary for the fire support base.

RECOMMENDATION: That, whenever feasible, a water point be established at remote fire support bases.

(2) Rearm - Refuel Point.

OBSERVATION: When utilizing helicopters from remote base camps much time is wasted when they must return to main base camps to refuel and/or rearm.

EVALUATION: To conserve time and blade hours a rearm/refuel point should be established at the remote base camp. Using a portable fuel pump and 500 gallons, collapsible, air transportable bladders, helicopters could be refueled at anytime. Also several pallets of various type rockets could be kept in stock, along with mini-gun ammunition, to rearm gunships. Due to this arrangement, the helicopters would not have to return to main base camps to refuel and rearm.

RECOMMENDATION: That for extended operations utilizing helicopters in remote areas, a small rearm/refuel point be established at the fire support base.

g. (U) Communications: None.

h. (U) Material: None.

i. (U) Other:

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVB:MMH

SUBJECT: Operational Reports--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCM 00-00 6

### (1) Countering Communist Propaganda Against the Chieu Hoi

OBSERVATION: One of the basic themes of communist propaganda against the Chieu Hoi Program is that the Hoi Chanh will be mistreated to the extent of being beaten, tortured or even killed when they rally.

EVALUATION: An effective technique in countering communist propaganda efforts in this area has been returning Hoi Chanh to their villages and hamlets to give first hand accounts of their rallying experience. By conducting periodic interviews in the local Chieu Hoi Center, it is possible to select and groom those individuals most capable of making a presentable and positive appearance. When the Hoi Chanh knows and can identify families of other VC or sympathizers, the program is much more effective. The mere fact the rallier is alive and well disputed the enemy's contentions. Ideally, the same Hoi Chanh should be returned periodically to demonstrate his continued good health and progress. MILCAP activities provide an excellent vehicle for inobtrusive integration of this PSYOP operation with routing military activity, thus minimizing the attention drawn to the returning Hoi Chanh as an individual. The fear of enemy retaliation against the Hoi Chanh's family is the most important factor to overcome in order to employ ralliers voluntarily. If the rallier refuses to cooperate physically, tapes can be used but remain far inferior to face to face proselyting. However, when specifically targeted against enemy units scattered over large areas, tape broadcasts have been proven successful.

RECOMMENDATION: (1) That Hoi Chanh should be periodically and systematically interviewed by PSYOP personnel to secure exploitable material.

(2) That selected Hoi Chanh returned to their hamlets to counter enemy propaganda themes.

(3) That cooperation with District Level PSYOP personnel is necessary to insure the program takes advantages of the specific local situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBBLMH

1 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry  
Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Follow-up Interviews of Hoi Chanh.

OBSERVATION: Hoi Chanh have revealed significantly exploitable PSYOP information during follow-up interviews which was not revealed in their initial interrogation or interview.

EVALUATION: The fact that Hoi Chanh have withheld valuable PSYOP information during initial processing can be attributed to a combination of several factors. During these first hours of detainment the Hoi Chanh is very apprehensive of what will befall him. This fear often leads him to relate only what he expects will please his captors. The initial pressure also inhibits his relating of everyday information which may have no immediate tactical value but is of extreme importance to the long range PSYOP effort. Later, when he has experienced good treatment and no longer fears for his well being, this individual will open up and become most receptive to visitors and the opportunity to return to his local hamlet even if it does require going through the formalities of making a propaganda speech. Such interviews have resulted in obtaining names of VC and/or sympathizers and their known relatives. On subsequent visits to the Hoi Chanh's hamlet these relatives have been visited and encouraged to induce their wayward family members to rally.

RECOMMENDATION: That initial Hoi Chanh interviews be followed up by additional interviews within a month of rallying.

26 Incl  
as  
Incl 2 - 12, 16 - 20,  
23 - 26 wd HQ, DA

*Andrew J. Gatsis*  
ANDREW J. GATSIS  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDCMH (1 Feb 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division  
for the period ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFUR - 65 (R2)

DA, HQ 25th Inf Div, APO San Francisco 96225

THRU: Commanding General, II FFORCEV, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO San  
Francisco 96266

Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHCC(DST), APO San Fran-  
cisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO San Fran-  
cisco 96558

TC: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department  
of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational  
Report - Lessons Learned of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division  
for the period ending 31 January 1970 with the following exceptions:

a. Page 3, paragraph 1b (4); a sixteen man augmentation to the  
brigade aviation strength is authorized on an authorized overstrength  
basis by United States Army, Vietnam. This augmentation is not  
authorized under MTOE 77-102T.

b. Page 3, paragraph 1b (5); operational control of the 3rd  
Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was assumed by II Field Force, Viet-  
nam which further placed that brigade under the operational control  
of the 25th Infantry Division on 26 July 1969.

c. Page 36, paragraph (8); Employment of Shell WP in Defensive  
Fires; the use of shell WP, zone 1, fuze time, Killer Junior, was  
found to be effective at ranges 200 to 300 meters from battery po-  
sition. Fuze time will not function prior to 2.0 seconds time of  
flight which is equal to 400 meters range.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JAMES M. CONNELL  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

AVFBC-RE-H (1 Feb 70) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry  
Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, MCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 962661 S E 11 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96315

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GEOP-DT, APO 96552

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for the period  
ending 31 January 1970, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*W. C. Bartel Jr.*  
W. C. BARTEL JR  
CPT AGC  
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (1 Feb 70) 3d Ind

2

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (U) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference items concerning "Response to Intelligence Reports and Enemy Use of Signals to Indicate US Ambushes in Hootch Areas", page 33, paragraph b(2): concur. Both of these articles have been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Utilization of the AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar to Verify Dufflebag Field Locations", page 37, paragraph c(10): concur. This radar can be utilized to vector aircraft to the desired emplant area or locate low flying aircraft to insure accurate air delivery of the ground sensors. The AN/TPS-25 can also be employed to guide and locate Dufflebag hand emplacement teams on the ground. This item will be published in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Countering Communist Propaganda Against the Chieu Hoi Program", page 39, paragraph 21: concur. The gathering of information from ralliers to use as PSYOP themes to combat enemy propaganda has proven effective. Returnees may be asked to volunteer to return to their hamlets, however, they cannot be forced to do so. Guidelines and policies for the exploitation of returnees is contained in MACV Directive 381-11.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
L. D. MURRAY

1st AGC

Subject: 1st AGC

Cy furn:

HQ, II FFORCEV

3d Bde, 9th Inf Div

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIS 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (1 Feb 70) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division  
for Period Ending 31 January 1970, KCS CSFOR-65 (K2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96358 13 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATION

ASSIGNED UNITS

RMC, 3d Brigade

6-31st Inf

2-47th Inf (Mech )

2-60th Inf

5-60th Inf

2-4th Fld Arty

E-75th Inf (Ranger)

US Army Air Cushion Vehicle Platoon

45th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

65th Inf Det (Combat Tracker)

19th Mil Hist Det

19th PI Det

39th Chem Det

493d MI Det

99th CS Spt Bn

56th Sig Co

571st Eng Co

483d MP Plt

264th FA Det (Radar)

276th FA Det (Radar)

Inclosure 1

CONFIDENTIAL

45



CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACHED UNITS

3/3-17th Cav  
367th Airfield Contro Det  
Weather Det  
ALO/FAC  
4th Civil Affairs Plt  
Eng Det (Water Supply)  
ADA Btry (40mm)  
ADA Ssc (Quad 50)  
FA Btry 155mm (SP) (GSR)  
Med Det (FM)  
Med Det (Vet)  
Wel Amb Det  
Interpreters  
Kit Carson Scouts  
MID (14th ARVN)

PARENT UNIT

3-17th Cav  
165th Avn Gp  
5th Weather Sqdn  
19th Tac Spt Sqdn  
2d Civil Affairs Co  
82d Eng Co  
5-2d Arty (1 Plt)  
5-2d Arty  
5-2d Arty (Mission Basis)  
20th FM Unit, on an area basis  
44th Med Bde, on an area basis  
44th Med Bde, on an area basis  
MACV  
Allocated by USARV G5  
MACV

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## COMBAT STATISTICS

MONTH	US KIA	US WIA	VC KIA	PW	HC	VC I	WEA. INC. SMALL ARMS	TOT. CH. W.
NOV	11	60	387	13	14	13	87	4
DEC	8	95	357	12	3	0	75	2
JAN	9	92	338	12	4	4	64	7
TOTAL	28	247	1082	37	21	17	226	13

## FRIENDLY LOSSES

UNIT	US KIA		US WIA		TOT		TOT	
	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOT	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOT
2-47	1	2	1	4	12	21	21	54
2-60	5	1	2	8	19	37	22	78
5-60	2	1	1	4	10	12	16	38
6-31	3	4	4	11	13	16	27	56
RANGER	0	0	0	0	5	7	2	14
ARTY	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
OTHER	0	0	1	1	0	1	4	5
TOTAL	11	8	9	28	60	95	92	247

## ENEMY LOSSES

UNIT	VC KIA		PW		TOT		TOT	
	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOT	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOT
2-47	55	53	54	162	4	6	2	12
2-60	72	47	38	157	1	4	1	6
5-60	57	48	46	151	0	1	0	1
6-31	33	31	31	95	6	1	6	13
B/3-17	37	27	41	105	1	0	1	2

Inclosure 13

47

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT	<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>							
	<u>VC KIA</u>					<u>PW</u>		
	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOT	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOT
UNGER	16	36	21	73	1	0	1	2
Y	49	39	49	137	0	0	0	0
A/F	30	13	25	68	0	0	0	0
ANG	32	50	23	105	0	0	1	1
OTHER	<u>6</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	387	357	338	1082	13	12	12	37

UNIT	<u>HOI CHANH</u>			
	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOTAL
2-47	2	0	0	2
2-60	12	1	2	15
5-60	0	0	1	1
6-31	0	2	1	3
B/3-17	0	0	0	0
RANGER	0	0	0	0
ARIY	0	0	0	0
OTHER	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	14	3	4	21

45

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF ACTUALS BY MONTH													
MONTH	UNIT	CAL.	CONFIRMED	ACQUIRED	CERT	PREP	INTERDICT	SP	OTHER	TOTAL	AVG	SIT	RDS
NOV	2/4	105	MSM RDS	MSM PDC	MSM RDS	MSM RDS	MSM RDS	MSM RDS	MSM RDS	MSM RDS	MSM RDS	MSM RDS	MSM RDS
DEC			112 7074	391 12464	13 312	39 3814	45 2613	146 3562	1	772 30496 25	603	1039	1728
JAN			120 8925	285 12117	3 44	28 2672		118 3879		554 27637 38			
TOTAL			145 15356	291 10462	2 24	29 2849		139 2315		606 31006 39			
NOV	5/42	155	377 31356	967 35043	18 380	96 9335	45 2613	403 9756	1	1932 89139 102	3960		
DEC			95 2126	147 3675	5 115	3 394	18 791	56 572		296 7827 12	154		
JAN			39 1914	169 3900	1 24	14 1198	1 7	42 652		265 7671 7	151		
TOTAL			42 2626	120 2384	6 139	8 998		44 481		215 6113 9	678		
NOV	C/7/8	175	136 6666	436 9999		25 2190	19 798	142 1705		776 21611 28	963		
DEC	A/7/8	175	4 67	26 113		2 6	8 46	1 2		41 235			
JAN	C/7/8	175	2 52	26 189		3 65	6 44	2 35		39 385			
TOTAL			1 7	15 15				1 17		5 39			
NOV	A/7/8	175	17 90	17 90				2 19		19 109			
DEC	C/7/8	175	13 74	13 74				7 118		24 431			
JAN	A/7/8	175	4 229	22 245		1 23		4 68		33 550			
TOTAL			6 214	22 245						161 1769			

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

## S3 AIR OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
BOMBS (TONS)	181	226.3	148	555.3
NAPALM (BOMBS)	170	63	56	289
BLDGS DEST	19	17	12	48
BLDGS DAM	2	18	4	24
BUNKERS DEST	181	217	176	574
BUNKERS DAM	10	42	20	72
KBA (BC)	20	11	26	57
KBA (POSS)	0	3	0	3
SEC EXPL	1	11	17	29
SAMPANS DEST	3	3	0	6
FIGHTING POSITIONS DEST	34	13	18	65

Inclosure 15

50

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMPANY E (RANGER) 75TH INFANTRY  
3D BRIGADE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

AFB-LF

31 January 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Company E (Ranger) 75th Infantry for Period  
1 November 1969 thru 31 January 1970, RGS GSEOL-65 (P-2) (U).

TO: Commanding Officer  
3d Bde 9th Inf Div  
ATTN: AVEB-LH  
APO San Francisco 96371

FROM: Commanding Officer  
Co E (Ranger) 75th Inf  
3d Bde 9th Inf Div  
APO San Francisco 96371

I. Section 1, Significant Activities:

A. Introduction: It is this unit's mission to provide the 3d Brigade 9th Infantry Division with small unit specialized Ranger combat tactics and to act as an immediate reaction force for the Brigade on intelligence and targets of a perishable nature. This unit engaged in training and combat operations a total of ninety (90) days out of a possible ninety-two (92) days encompassed by this reporting period. The specific types of operations this unit engaged in during this reporting period were Ranger Raids, Night Hunter and Night Ambush patrols within the Brigade's T.OI.

B. Organization: Co E (Ranger) 75th Infantry is organized into four (4) sections; Headquarters, Operations, Forward Operations Base FOR platoon and two (2) Operational Field platoons consisting of three (3) Ranger teams each. Since we are in direct support of the brigade, our company is located at the basecamp of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Tan An, RVN.

See Inclosure 1 for the graphic representation of the organization of this unit, and the key personnel roster.

C. Personnel and Administration: During this reporting period this unit experienced the loss of seventy-five percent of our combat experienced field troops to normal DEROS. As a result we were forced to expedite a recruiting program at Brigade and Battalion level to gain combat veteran volunteers to fill the void in our unit. During this void period this unit was only able to field four (4) operational teams, which in turn effected the number of combat missions we were able to run. Maintenance of unit strength is a constant problem because individuals must be volunteers for the unit, consequently we must constantly search for qualified volunteers to maintain our unit strength. Because this unit is comprised of strictly volunteers, morale and discipline do not pose any great problem areas. Discipline is maintained thru proper military procedure.

Incl 21

51

3: January 70

## SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (con't)

D. Intelligence: In the field of intelligence, this unit maintains in our Operations Section an Intel NCO whose duty it is to maintain and compile reports of enemy activity and locations. From this information we determine our targets and what type operation we intend to employ in the target area. During this reporting period enemy activity was most prevalent during the hours of darkness, and they attempted to establish secure areas where they could remain undetected and avoid engaging in major contact with U.S. and Allied Forces. This Brigade's TAOI is located to interdict the major Delta enemy infiltration routes, and we concluded that the enemy was moving through our TAOI to other areas void of American Forces. With the exception of three (3) major contacts, the enemy was well dispersed and only traveled in small groups of three to five personnel. Also, due to the fact that it was the wet harvest season, local Guerillas and local forces were engaged in harvesting rice. The weather and terrain also effected offensive operations. Because of the monsoon season closing and the fact that the majority of the Mekong Delta region was underwater at this time, offensive operations were shortened in length to afford personnel the opportunity to properly "dry out" to avoid contracting fungus infections and "paddy foot". This unit draws its intelligence from numerous sources; 493d MI Detachment, USARV Liaison Detachment, Provincial Recon Unit (PRU) sources and from actual combat operations, and information gained from Hoi Chans and PCUS. To cope with the enemy's attempt to remain hidden and avoid major contact, we modified our offensive operations to meet the enemies change in tactics. These operations and modifications will be explained in detail in Section I, paragraph E of this report, as will the recapitulation of enemy losses as a direct result of this units offensive operations.

E. Operations: Due to the flexible organization of this unit, we are able to "tailor" specific forces for specific operations to accomplish our mission within the Brigade TAOI. During this reporting period this unit conducted primarily Ranger Raid, Night Hunter and Night Ambush Patrols. During this reporting period this unit ran a total of 290 combat missions in ninety days.

(1) Ranger Raid: This type operation was very successful during this reporting period. We modified our operational concept of this mission slightly to cope with the enemy's attempt to stay hidden and to avoid making contact.

- (a) Using Hoi Chans on the insertion slick to give positive identification of intel targets or target areas.
- (b) Inserting at night on targets of perishable intelligence.
- (c) Using battalion airmobile targets, inserting first to evaluate the possible productivity of their targets.
- (d) Using airmobiling battalions to File-on once we have established contact in a target area.

Summation: This particular operation provided the Brigade with its two largest contacts of the reporting period. On 12 December and again on 12 January Ranger teams inserted on intel targets and on both occasions located the Headquarters element of the 1st NVA Regiment. After contact was initiated this unit was supported by the airmobiling 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry with the File-on technique.

## SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (con't)

2. Night Ambush Patrols: Due to the fact that enemy activity was most prevalent during the hours of darkness, our major operation during this time was roving Night Ambush Patrols. Targets were chosen on known enemy infiltration routes, known or suspected cache sites, known or suspected areas of enemy troop concentrations, on or near areas where electrical sensing devices were implanted, and in hamlets where the population was sympathetic to the communist cause. This operation was our most productive, and our major concern was to vary our insertion methods and techniques to add deception to the actual operation. When using helicopters for insertion, we utilized a series of false insertions and extractions for deception purposes, and when operating in the Plain of Reeds we inserted after dark by ACV (Air-cushioned Vehicles) to avoid position detection by the enemy. Operating in this way we made contact or sighted with the enemy an estimated thirty per-cent of our missions.

3. Night Hunter Missions: This mission, where a Panther Team is on 24 hour stand-by for instant reaction to Radar Sightings, "Dufflebag" activations or Brigade directed targets, was utilized extensively producing few tangible results. When going into an area that is not populated we normally utilize "Hot Insertions." Artillery and/or supporting gunships prep the LZ, and when the insertion slick is on short final, gunships suppress the flanks of the insertion point. The insertion point is marked by artillery with a White Phosphorous (WP) round on the deck while illumination bursts simultaneously overhead. When inserting into populated areas we modify the method of insertion from "Hot to Cold", without a LZ prep, to preclude wounding or killing civilians. This method also does not telegraph our intent to insert until the WP round and illumination burst on the target. The two contacts we had on this mission resulted from this method of insertion.

4. Recapitulation of Enemy Losses: The following statistics is a recapitulation of enemy losses as a direct result of this unit's offensive operations.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>SIGHTINGS</u>	<u>CONTACTS</u>	<u>KIA'S</u>	<u>KPA'S</u>
November	90	38	12	16	5
December	99	25	22	36	6
January	101	25	12	21	17
TOTALS	290	98	46	73	28

During this reporting we also captured 25 POW'S, 13 individual and 1 crew served weapon, 40 pounds of enemy webgear and equipment, 6 enemy radios, and about 30 pounds of documents

F. Training: This unit maintains a constant training schedule on the subject matter pertinent to Ranger Operational techniques, and subjects necessary for operating in the Mekong Delta, RVN. Our normal training cycle is set to completely rotate subject matter every three



31 January 70

## SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (con't)

months to accomodate the personnel turn-over in the unit. Our training program is establish on a twenty five per-cent formal instruction, and seventy five per-cent on the job training (OJT) basis. In our Operations Section we maintain a Training NCO (SSC-E6) whose responsibility it is to establish and maintain an effective and up to date training program.

G. Logistics: The logistics system for this unit pose a constant problem. By our MTOE we are authorized Supply, Commo and Motor Sergeants, but by the same document we are not authorized to maintain a PILL of repair parts. This fact makes us completely dependent on our Parent Unit for repair work. Radios, Weapons and Vehicles are critically important items to us to maintain a combat effective rating. Repair work on radios, weapons and vehicles thru normal Army logistic channels is normally very time consuming and very often leaves us short critical items of equipment.

II. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

A. Personnel:

1. Observation: This unit is unable to rely on normal personnel replacement procedure due to the fact we require all members to be volunteers. It is also a virtual impossibility to take a "green" recruit, fresh in-country and expect him to face our normal combat experiences without prior combat experience and prior knowledge of enemy tactics.

2. Recommendation: When possible personnel with stateside Ranger and Airborne training should be assigned to this specific type unit when they arrive in-country. When this replacement system cannot produce the required personnel, this unit must be allowed to conduct monthly recruiting interviews to larger combat units to replace personnel losses.

B. Operations:

1. Observation: Some aspects of the different missions mention previously could be incorporated to the "Recon" units at battalion levels with very little effort and guidance from this unit as to the techniques of each type operation.

2. Evaluation:

(a) Ranger Raids: This type mission is an excellent way to react to perishable intel targets and to find and fix the enemy. After evaluating the specific target or if contact is made we can either exploit the target ourselves or call for re-inforcements.

(b) Night Hunter: This mission is an excellent way to react to electrical sensing devices. Again this mission could be incorporated at battalion level, but the larger units would have to "tailor" a special force for this specific mission.

3. Recommendations: Night Hunter insertions on "Dufflebag" activations; due to the fact it normally takes between 30 to 45 minutes from notification to insertion of troops on target, "Dufflebag" activations should be eliminated as a target source for this mission, and should be

AVBR-LP

31 January 71

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (con't)

engaged by artillery. To date we have had negative results in our  
Dufflebag activations.

*Edward G. Roecker*

for ALBERT C. ZWARTZ  
CPT INF  
Commanding Officer

DICG:  
45-copies addressee  
10-copies unit file  
cc:III

A 10-12

31 January 1970

SUBJECT Operational Report of Lessons Learned (cont)  
 INC 1, REF; Page 1, Section I Para 2

# HEADQUARTERS

* CO	- CPT
* 1SG	- E-8
FIELD 1ST	- E-7
* CO CLK	- E-5
* ARD CLK	- E-5
* SUPPLY SGT	- E-6
SUPPLY CLK	- E-5
* MOTOR SGT	- E-6
MEDIC	- E-5

# OPERATIONS

* OIC	- 1LT
* NCOIC	- E-7
* INTEL SGT	- E-6
ENG SGT	- E-6

# FIELD PLAT'S

OIC - 1LT			
	TM#	TM#	TM#
* TEAM LEADER			
* ASST TEAM LEADER			
SNIPER			
M-60			
M-79			
RIFLEMAN (MEDIC)			
RIFLEMAN (DEMO)			
REAR GUNNER			

# FOB PLAT

* NCOIC - E-6
* COMM SGT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

\* Indicates KEY Personnel in the Company

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
AIR CUSHION VEHICLE UNIT  
3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div  
APO San Francisco 96371

AVBB-CV

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Air Cushion Vehicle Unit for period ending  
31 January 1970.

FROM: Commanding Officer  
Air Cushion Vehicle Unit  
3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div  
APO San Francisco 96371

TO: Commanding Officer  
3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div  
ATTN: AVBB-MH  
APO San Francisco 96371

Section I

(1) SIGNIFICANT UNIT ACTIVITIES: During the period the ACV Unit conducted fourteen combat operations ranging in duration from two to six days and totalling fifty-six days in the field. All combat operations were conducted in the Plain of Reeds area in the western end of the Long An Province. In addition, two driver-training operations were conducted at Nha Be lasting six days. Units providing infantry platoons that were attached to the unit for operations and the days each worked with the unit are indicated below:

Recon Platoon, 5/60th Inf:	4 days
Company C, 2/60th Inf:	1 day
Recon Platoon, 6/31st Inf:	20 days
Long An Province Intel Platoon (VN):	(Combined) 4 days
Tu Tu District PF Platoon (VN):	(Combined) 8 days
Company B, 5/60th Inf:	5 days
Company A, 5/60th Inf:	10 days
Company C, 6/31st Inf:	8 days
Company A, 6/31st Inf:	4 days

Two ACV's were used to support all of the indicated operations, except one operation where three ACV's were used. Platoon strengths ranged from seventeen to thirty-six personnel, the average complement of mounted infantry being twelve troops per ACV. Twelve communists were KIA, three POW's were seized and five individual weapons were captured as a result of ACV reconnaissance and ambush operations in Western Long An Province.

Significant caches were found near FSB Shiloh on 19 November and 20 November. Included in these finds were: 99 82mm mortar rounds, 92 B-40 rockets, 36 B-41 rockets, 160 Chicom hand grenades, 40 Chicom anti-tank grenades, 17 21 lb cases of TNT, 4 Chicom claymores, 1 AK-47 and 6200 rounds of SA ammunition. On 9 December near FSB Gettysburg, another cache was found consisting of 27 82mm mortar rounds, 24 B-40 rockets, 36 Chicom hand grenades, 8 Chicom rifle grenades

and 2200 rounds of SA ammunition.

One ACV was destroyed on 9 Jan when it detonated what was believed to be a 500 lb bomb west of FSB Gettysburg. Although the ACV was completely destroyed, it is significant to note that none of the 17 personnel aboard were killed.

Operations during the period consisted of reconnaissance; security; night ambushes; reaction to infantry ambushes, radar sightings and dufflebag readings; and insertion and extraction of infantry ambushes. Operations were primarily conducted at night under illumination provided by artillery, mortars, and hand held flares. Forward bases for the operations were FSBs Shiloh and Gettysburg. Operations were closely coordinated and executed with the Commander, Task Group 1949, US Navy in the "Giant Slingshot" area of operations. Support from Navy "Seawolf" gunships and "Black Pony" OV-10 assault aircraft was readily available and used several times to cover ACV operations.

During this period, training and replacement of many critical personnel was accomplished. Included are the Unit C.O., Vehicle commander, all primary ACV drivers, and numerous other unit personnel.

Four formal ACV Orientations were conducted during the reporting period.

1. Nov 23 MG Rowny - DCS R&D  
BG Black - ACSFOR
2. Dec 17 Major of San Diego, Calif.
3. Dec 26 LTC Minh,  
BG Girard - CMAC
4. Jan 27 COL Inskeep,  
LTC Smith - ACTIV

## II Commander's Report

### (a) Problems

1. The loss of ACV USA# 6815902 on 9 Jan reduced the number of ACV's on hand to two. Since there is now no backup craft available, it can be expected that longer maintenance periods will be occasionally required. However, due to the much improved maintenance and logistical operations, the unit expects to continue operations at its present high rate of availability.

### (b) Personnel and Logistical support

1. The unit has experienced an acceptable rate of personnel replacement. All primary drivers were trained and replaced during the period, along with one new vehicle commander. Although eleven key personnel will DEROS in the next 120 days, it is felt that no serious problems will arise if the present rate of replacements is maintained.

### (c) Tactical and technical innovations.

#### 1a Overland night operations:

On 24 November 1969 two Air Cushion vehicles conducted a night ambush near FSB Shiloh. This ambush was conducted to verify the feasibility of utilizing the ACV in this role and in support of other ground infantry ambushes. The success of this and subsequent night operations has led the unit to operate primarily at night in support of infantry elements.

## III Lessons Learned

### (a) Training

1. Observation: Concerted driver training programs can be effectively conducted within capabilities of the unit in a relatively short period.

Evaluation: During December a concerted driver training program was conducted within the unit to replace the three departing primary drivers. After extensive classroom instruction and training, the unit conducted two three day driver training operations at Nha Be. After this extensive water training at Nha Be, the trainee drivers will be integrated into combat overland operations under the close supervision of the experienced drivers. This extensive effort resulted in giving basic background instruction to new primary drivers with only a six day loss of combat availability.

Recommendation: The results obtained from a six day driver training operation greatly enhance the training of new drivers, and should be continued.

(b) Personnel

2. Observation: Survivability of personnel on board ACV's is outstanding.

Evaluation: On 9 January 1970, ACV 902 was destroyed when it struck what was believed to be a dud 500 lb. bomb. Although fourteen of the seventeen personnel on board the ACV were injured, no one was killed, and all but one man was quickly returned to duty. This man will fully recover.

Recommendation: That the effects of overpressure and turbulence be researched as a dissipator of an explosive force.

(c) Operations

Observation: Throughout the reporting period ACV's operated primarily at night in ambushes and as a reaction force to support ground infantry ambushes, radar sightings and dufflebag activations. The Plain of Reeds provides a very suitable terrain for the ACV operations and illumination provided by artillery, mortars and hand-held flares provides sufficient light to navigate and search for the enemy.

Recommendation: That the ACV Unit continue to expand its night operations in the Plain of Reeds area, and if sufficient support is available, in other suitable areas in Long An Province.

Observation: ACV ambushes are effective and provide excellent flexibility as a point of departure for subsequent night operations.

Evaluation: On the night of 1-2 December 1969 at 0435 hours a group of 10-12 Communists moved into the center of the prepared night location of the ACV Unit and its dismounted infantry elements. Five enemy were killed and one was captured from the ambush with no U.S. casualties. ACV ambushes located in the general area of other ground infantry ambushes provide fast and effective support to elements who have made contact.

Recommendation: That ACV ambushes be planned in close coordination with infantry ambushes so that reaction support can be utilized with a minimum of reaction time.

Observation: Two Air Cushion Vehicles are capable of sustaining insertion/extraction/reaction support for two rifle companies without additional support.

Evaluation: Throughout December and January the ACV unit, while operating out of FSB Gettysburg, inserted, extracted and provided the reaction force for the one/two companie(s) located at the FSB. No major problems were encountered during emplacement or extraction of the ambushes and a C&C aircraft was required only on inserting in unfamiliar or rough terrain. The insertions and extractions can be completed relatively fast

UNCLASSIFIED

due to the speed of the ACV and its load carrying capability of one platoon (20-28 personnel) per craft.

Recommendation: That supported commanders continue to challenge the Air Cushion Vehicle Unit for support in imaginative combat and auxiliary combat support roles.

*Kate H. Root*  
for DUANE B ROOT  
MAJOR, Armor  
Commanding

Best Available Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - P &amp; J

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT NUMBER (If any)	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
3. REPORT TITLE		2b. GROUP	
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division		4	
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CO, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
1 February 1970		63	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO. N/A		701298	
c.		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

Best Available Copy